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Abstract  
Even though train protection systems are used to avoid critical situations, the train driver remains 
responsible for the continuous monitoring of signal aspects and the derivation of suitable reactions. This 
requirement persists, although the position of signals shifts more and more from trackside signals to in-
cab displays, especially with advanced levels of train protection and automatic train control. Errors in the 
detection and interpretation of signal- or display information and driver distraction may lead to severe 
accidents. Aim of our research at the DLR Institute of Transportation Systems (ITS) is to develop 
innovative concepts of the train driver’s workplace in order to secure a safe and efficient railway system 
that keeps the driver ‘in the loop’. Therefore, we follow a user centred approach. The train driver 
participates directly in the development and evaluation process of new systems supporting the work in 
the driver’s cabin. Using our driver’s cabin simulator recently built at the ITS as a flexible vehicle 
platform in a simulation environment, we are able to investigate the driving behaviour and the train 
driver’s information processing during his or her task. Based on the results, we derive concepts in order 
to optimize the presentation of necessary information and give recommendations how to assist the train 
driver. In the present paper, first concepts for supporting the train driver in keeping attention are 
described as well as our simulation environment and the methodology used. 
1. Introduction 
Today, train protection systems are often used to avoid critical situations in railway traffic. However, the 
train driver remains responsible for the continuous monitoring of signal aspects and the derivation of 
suitable actions. The requirement persists, although monitoring shifts somewhat from trackside 
signalling to in-cab displays. This shift is due to the ongoing implementation of advanced levels of train 
protection and automatic train control (e.g., continuous train control system LZB and European Train 
Control System ETCS, level 2). In these cases, especially mode transitions (like switching from full- to 
limited supervision or to Class B-systems) need to be anticipated and detected alongside other possible 
disruptions. Errors in the detection and interpretation of such a signal or display information may lead to 
severe accidents. 
Signals passed at danger (SPADs) are one of the most common and consistent causes of incidents in 
international railway operations and can be attributed to errors of the train driver. The German railway 
accident examination center [1], for example, has registered 462 non-technical failure SPADs out of a 
total 752 reported incidents in 2011. In 2012, out of 723 incidents 415 were SPADs [2]. Retrospective 
investigations concerning the development of these incidents uncover complex and highly individual 
interactions between various performance shaping factors. These factors are, for example, type of 
signal, time of day/ year, weather conditions, driver experience and other person related aspects (see 
[3]). A closer look reveals that besides these factors errors also often result from a disadvantageous 
human machine interaction. 
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Great effort has been put into the prevention of passing signals at warning and stopping aspects by 
developing assistance or automation technology. Train protection systems serve, for example, to 
signalise and monitor braking curves, monitor speed restrictions and stops at main signals. They also 
initiate a forced emergency brake in case of violations. However, although these systems have helped 
mitigating the severity of consequences of SPADs, they have not eliminated the issue ([4,5], see also 
[3]). Catastrophic accidents, like the Hordorf train collision in Germany in 2011 [6] or the derailment in 
Santiago de Compostela in 2013, can still occur if a train driver fails to attend to rail-side signals where 
such technologies fail or have not or not yet been equipped.  
Even with well operating systems in place, inadequate interpretations of and reactions to signal aspects 
can still cause critical incidents, for instance by “slipping” past a signal at danger and its associated 
safety overlap or by unjustified releases of train protection braking [3]. In order to prevent critical 
incidents, train drivers may not entirely rely on the train protection infrastructure and still need to attend 
signal aspects and speed limits in their environment. In order to fulfil this task, train drivers need to be 
familiar with the route they are driving, the surrounding area, signal positions, and speed limits. They 
also need to know the speed restriction sections as, for example, the position of curves, stations, and 
constructions sites.  
Aim of our research at the Institute of Transportation Systems at the German Aerospace Center (DLR) 
is to develop innovative concepts of human-machine interfaces at the train driver’s workplace in order to 
secure a safe and efficient railway system that keeps the driver ‘in the loop’. To reach this aim, we 
follow a user centred research and design approach. This approach is described in the following 
section. 
2. Research approach 
2.1 User Centred Design 
A comprehensive perspective in railway systems research requires an approach that does not focus 
solely on technology. It also has to consider human operators as a crucial impact factor. The Rail 
Human Factors research at DLR follows a user centred design approach. We directly involve the 
personnel of the railway industry into the design process. With this approach, we pursue the goal to 
make a valuable contribution towards the user-friendly, safe and smooth rail transport of tomorrow [7]. 
Our research is based on three key points: understanding the user (operator), evaluating existing 
systems, and developing and testing new concepts. Moreover, we transfer established methods from 
psychophysiology and user-centred design to these three key points of evaluation and design and 
develop new methods (e.g., questionnaires, simulation environments). The approach is described in 
detail in [7]. 
2.2 Developing information and assistance systems for train drivers 
Based on our user centred design approach, we execute the following steps in order to either develop 
future human-machine interfaces for the train driver or to refine existing interfaces: 
(1) investigate cognitive functions and procedures implied in the train driver’s work,  
(2) develop strategies for error prevention and the design of driver assistance and advisory 
systems in rail traffic, 
(3) translate the strategies into first interface design concepts, 
(4) evaluate the concepts, e.g., regarding distraction potential, usability, and intuitive interaction, 
(5) refine the concepts according to the evaluation results. 
In the following, an example for the application of this process will be described. 
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2.2.1 Enhancement of the German intermittent train protection system interface  
Occasionally, in the context of incident and accident analysis, specific aspects in the design of train 
protection systems are mentioned as possible causes of attention deficits and resulting errors of train 
drivers (e.g., [8,9], see [3]). In Germany, the intermittent train protection PZB 90 (formerly known as 
‘inductive train protection’) is the most widespread train protection system. Usually a distant signal 
informs the driver about the signal aspect of an upcoming main signal. He or she has to attend the 
distant signal and if necessary, regulate the train’s speed and actuate the in-vehicle PZB buttons related 
to the signal aspect. The PZB automatically elicits a forced brake when either the PZB buttons are not 
actuated or a violation of the required braking curve is detected on approach towards the main signal, 
after passing a distant signal with a warning aspect.  
The PZB is designed in order to mitigate train drivers’ errors in attending the distant signals. Still, the in-
vehicle interfaces that inform the driver about a necessary reaction are not safe in terms of the signal 
safety standards of the railway research. The only signal the train driver may rely on is the trackside 
distant signal. On rare occasions, in-vehicle PZB interfaces can fail, for example when a PZB magnet 
on the track is damaged. Then the in-vehicle interfaces do not inform the driver about the necessary 
deceleration and thus does not prevent human errors with regard to an inadequate brake operation. A 
delayed braking reaction at the main signal can result and endanger for example other trains in the next 
block section. Thus, signals passed at danger remain one of the primary causes of railway incidents. In 
order to develop a new concept of assisting the train driver in keeping attention, we followed the 
process presented in 2.2: 
(1) In a first step, we conducted a deeper analysis of the attention processes and the interrelations 
of causes regarding attention deficits in the context of the train drivers’ workplace. The result is 
a description of the processes in a system related onset model of attention deficits [10]. System 
design is assumed to be a central influencing factor in the formation of expectations, states, and 
behaviour of the operators. In addition, a feedback loop is assumed between operator states 
and behaviour on the one hand and system related and self-related perceptions of the operator 
on the other hand. Since passivity and reduced vigilance are relevant symptoms of monotony, 
they are additionally included in the model. Based on the model and a group discussion with 
train drivers (N=6; work experience 6-37 years), we drew conclusions concerning 
disadvantageous design features of the PZB. One key result is that train drivers sometimes 
tend to confirm the PZB buttons as a kind of automatic reaction towards in vehicle PZB 
indicators lamps without previously attending all necessary information in the environment, 
especially the aspect of the distant signal. This can lead to severe incidents. 
(2) In a second step, we translated the most important conclusion from the earlier analysis into a 
strategy for keeping the train drivers’ attention: all different signal aspects should be actively 
confirmed with specific responses.  
(3) In a third step, we developed ideas about how to design this additional confirmation action as 
an input for the human-machine interface (HMI) of the PZB train protection. Three ideas (a 
signal specific shifting lever, touch screen, and gesture input) were selected as most promising 
from a usability perspective, regarding low complexity of interaction, feedback, and scope of 
enhancing the functional range. The concepts were discussed with train drivers afterwards 
(N=12; work experience 10-38 years). They favoured the shifting interface (see Fig. 1). Thus, 
we chose the manual shifting interface as a new to develop HMI strategy that could replace the 
current version of the PZB interface. The refined manual shifting system consists of four 
different positions: three specific positions for each possible aspect of the distant signal and a 
neutral rest/ idle position (Fig. 2). 
(4) The shifting system was implemented as a prototype in our train drivers’ cabin simulation 
environment RailSET® (Railway Simulation Environment for Train Drivers and Operators) and 
then evaluated. The current version of the PZB was compared to the new alternative shifting 
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interface. Nineteen train drivers with an average work experience of 9 years took part in the 
study. Gaze direction, usability, and cognitive load were measured. 
(5) Finally, conclusions for refinement of the tested shifting system were derived (e.g., automatic 
fall-back of the shifting lever in the idle position, embedding in ETCS, and integration of a head-
up display). These recommendations can be implemented in a future version of the prototype. 
 
 
   
Figure 1. PZB - shifting lever concept (left), touch screen concept (middle), and gesture input concept 
(right) as concepts for distant signal aspect confirmation in the train protection system PZB. The shifting 
interface was favoured by the train drivers (green pins). 
 
 
Figure 2. Shifting interface for confirming the signal aspect seen by the train driver. Signal aspects can 
be: the next main signal shows either approach, slow approach or stop (signal at danger). 
2.3 Our simulation environment: The AIM Modular Mockup Rail  
In the near future, we will also be able to use our driver’s cabin simulator AIM Modular Mockup Rail for 
executing the steps (1) and (2) in the process of developing new advisory and assistance systems (see 
2.2). This will include the investigation of train drivers’ cognitive processes as well as the evaluation of 
prototypes and systems. The simulator has recently been built at the DLR Institute of Transportation 
Systems (ITS) in the context of the Application Platform Intelligent Mobility (AIM). It is a flexible vehicle 
platform in a simulation environment with which we are able to implement and evaluate a huge variety 
of train cabin interior and -control systems. This is a new and unique feature compared to commercial 
training simulators. Figure 3a shows the perforated plates for mounting any kind of control system, for 
example, in the form of touch-screen terminals. With the perforated floor plate, variations in the foot 
pedal- and the driver’s seat positions are possible. Figure 3b shows the driver’s position and a potential 
arrangement of control systems around him. With this setup, different arrangements of the control 
panels in the cabin can systematically be compared. Additionally, a variety of driving environments and 
situations can systematically be simulated and displayed with a 360° vision system.  
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Figure 3. a) perforated plate for mounting interior components, e.g., control panels;  
     b) train driver’s position and potential arrangement of control panels 
The AIM Modular Mockup Rail can be used in three different setups, namely as a: 
1) stand-alone mockup including driver’s cab (Fig. 4) with either screens or a projection system 
displaying the virtual driving environment in front, 
2) mockup in the Virtual Reality Lab at the DLR Institute of Transportation Systems with a 
360°vision system, or 
3) mockup in the Motion Simulator at the DLR Institute of Transportation Systems, mapping real 
dynamics of acceleration onto the virtual driving environment for a highly realistic driving 
experience. 
 
            
Figure 4. AIM Modular Mockup Rail including driver’s cab 
With our AIM Modular Mockup Rail, we are able develop new approaches for future information and 
assistance systems. We can also conduct evaluation studies of existing control panels or concepts in 
development. In collaboration with rail operators and manufacturers, we can implement any cabin 
design in our simulation environment and test the usability and ergonomics. The mockup can also be 
used for evaluating light rail control systems and cabin design. 
3. Perspective 
With the ongoing rollout of ECTS, transitions between different train protection system and mode 
transitions will be relevant. This is accompanied by high demands for the train drivers. In an upcoming 
study, we are going to develop assistance for the train driver for coping with theses transitions and 
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maintaining a high level of situation awareness concerning the actual system state and the actual 
protection or automation level. As in the previous studies, we are going to follow the steps of the user-
centred design approach described in chapter 2.2. The prototype of the developed assistance concept 
will then be evaluated in our simulation environment AIM Modular Mockup Rail. 
Aditionally we are planning to conduct evaluation studies in collaboration with rail operators and 
manufacturers using the AIM Modular Mockup Rail. We offer systematic evaluations of, for example, 
usability and user experience, ergonomics, intuitive interaction, and efficiency of systems or concepts in 
development. We pursue the goal to give recommendations for further development of the respective 
systems and the cabin design as a whole. 
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